We propose a novel methodology to estimate how much of the variation in bond returns can be attributed to macroeconomic news announcements. We find that economic news can explain 20% of the total daily variation in U.S.
Introduction
To what extent can price changes in financial markets be attributed to the arrival of new information?
Understanding what drives asset prices is of key importance in financial economics. We expect asset prices react to macroeconomic news announcements or the outcome of FOMC meetings implying that investors update prices in response to new information. Yet many studies 1 find it very hard to establish any link between economic fundamentals and asset prices. The strongest exception is provided by event studies linking the returns in the minutes following the announcement to the surprise in this announcement 2 . Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (2001) , for example, find that surprise component of the announcement explains up to 68% of bond price variation in small around the announcement. These studies, however, say nothing on how much of the total return variation can be attributed to (news on) fundamentals, or whether the initial price reaction reflects a permanent change in the price or just a transitory one. To address this issue, some studies investigate news effects on daily returns (e.g. Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005 , Vrugt, 2009 and Beber and Brandt, 2009 ). However, announcements are found to be much less important at the daily frequency. Macroeconomic news can explain only up to 8% of daily bond variation (Hardouvelis, 1988 , McQueen and Roley, 1993 , Altavilla, Giannone, and Modugno, 2014 ).
We use a novel methodology to study the relation between economic news and 10-year U.S. Treasury returns. Rather than using indirect information from surprises in macroeconomic announcements we make use of the return reaction in the 20 minutes around an announcement. We regress the daily returns on these 20-minute returns following the news. There are several advantages of our approach. First, the regression 2 gives a direct indication how much of the variation in daily returns can be attributed to news announcements. Second, we can analyze the importance of specific announcements for bond markets in terms of permanent price changes. Our novel method shows that several announcements are much more important than previously thought, whereas some news that comes out strong in surprise regressions turns out to be less important. Third, we directly measure news from the market reaction as opposed to using survey-based surprise measures. This is crucial as we confirm earlier findings that 1 A famous early example for currencies is Meese and Rogoff (1983) where authors are unable to relate exchange rate moves to macroeconomic fundamentals.
regressing daily returns on surprises hardly gives any significant results (average 2 is only 3.3%).
Fourth, we do not need surveys to compute surprises allowing us to take into account more announcements and use a longer sample. For example we can include the FOMC minutes in our analysis.
Finally, we can easily aggregate over multiple announcements to provide a measure of how much of the bond returns can be attributed to news in general. A disadvantage of our approach is that other events on the same day provide noise on measuring the importance of news announcements. In that sense we provide a lower bound on the importance of news. Nevertheless we already find a much stronger relation between bond prices and news than other studies. Also if two announcements always occur at the same time we cannot tell which of the two announcements is most important. Here also analyzing intraday reactions to the surprises of the respective news announcements can provide a solution.
Macroeconomic news accounts for a large part of total return variation. Based on 57 announcements we find that 20% in the variation of daily bond returns 3 can be attributed to the news announcements.
This is a much higher figure than previously found in the literature. For example Evans and Lyons (2008) infer from the results of Andersen et al. (2003) that not more than 2% of the total price variation is caused by news announcements. In fact, for the 55 U.S. macroeconomic announcements we have surprise data our novel methodology indicates news explains 20% of the variation in daily returns, whereas replacing the 20-minute returns by weighted (with hindsight) surprises suggests only 6% of the daily variation in bond returns is explained by news. This is in line with existing studies, showing that at most 8% of total daily bond return variation can be explained by the surprises (Hardouvelis, 1988 , McQueen and Roley, 1993 , Altavilla, Giannone, and Modugno, 2014 .
Zooming in on individual announcements we find that the top five most important announcements from 1996 to 2013 are FOMC target rate announcements (explains 55% of the variation in daily bond returns on 130 FOMC announcement days), Employment report (46%), GDP Advance 4 (36%) and GDP Preliminary (36%), and Efficiency of Industrial Workers report (24%). In contrast, based on regressing daily bond returns on surprises the top five consists of Nonfarm Payrolls (21%) 5 , ISM manufacturing (13%), Chicago PMI (11%), ISM non-manufacturing (11%) and Retail Sales (15%). We find FOMC 3 Announcements occur on 76% of all trading days. Considering only announcement days announcements explain 24% of the bond return variation.
4 Since Q1 2003 the GDP personal consumption advance and preliminary are released at the same time as the general GDP advance and GDP preliminary, respectively. For this shorter period the explained variation in bond returns rises to 53% and 59%, respectively.
5 One advantage of the surprise regressions is that it shows which of multiple announcement surprises at the same time drives bond returns. Payroll surprises are much more important (21%) than unemployment surprises (1%). Both announcements are part of the employment report.
target rate announcements to be very important, whereas surprises suggest it is not. Also GDP advance and preliminary are much more important than what we would conclude from surprise regressions. Hence both FOMC target rate and GDP advance/preliminary announcements have a substantial and lasting impact on bond prices, whereas the effect of manufacturing surveys and retail sales announcements not as important as previously thought.
The importance of news for bond prices varies over time. First, using 1-year rolling windows we find the explanatory power is the lowest at 5% for the period ending in December 2000 and the highest at 51%
for the period ending in December 2004. Second, news is less important when the VIX is high and Baker and Wurgler (2007) sentiment is positive. Third, we find news that is contrary to the direction of FED rate changes is more important. For example news with negative effect on yield is more important when FED rate is increasing. Fourth, news closer before the next FOMC meeting are more important than news immediately after the last meeting.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 10-year bond futures data and the U.S. macroeconomic and FOMC announcements. The methodology is presented in Section 3.
Section 4 discusses the results from our novel approach. The comparison with surprise data is provided in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Data

Macroeconomic data
We use an extensive set of U.S. macroeconomic news data. We use real-time data on 57 U.S. macroeconomic announcements, collected from Bloomberg which is a widely used data source by market participants. The data set includes announcement date, time, and for most of the announcements the The surprise part of the announcement is calculated as the difference between actual and consensus values. In order to compare the market impact across the announcements we standardize the surprises with the full sample standard deviation following Balduzzi et al. (2001) . Hence standardized news for announcement at time is
7 From June 2003 onwards also overnight trading takes place. Hence for future research but for a shorter period it is possible to look at the impact of announcements outside the CME trading hours.
where , is the expected and , the announced figure of announcement at time , and � is the full sample standard deviation of surprises , − , .
Treasury bond futures data
We use intraday data for 10-year Treasury bond futures from Tickdata.com. Throughout the paper we use 1-minute log returns providing 400 1-minute returns every trading day on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, from 8:20 to 15:00 Eastern Standard Time (similar to Evans, 2011) . The 1-minute prices used in the return calculations are determined as the price at which the last trade before the beginning of the minute was executed. The futures contract is rolled to the next contract when the daily day-session tick volume of the back-month contract exceeds the daily tick volume. Tick volume is the number of price changes, which indicates the trade activity of a contract. We also use total (including overnight return from 15:00 to 8:20 Eastern Standard Time) close-to-close daily futures returns in our analysis. The close is defined as close of open outcry trading (15:00 Eastern Standard Time). Thus daily returns are computed from the 15:00 of the previous trading day until 15:00 of the current day. All returns used in this paper are in basis points.
Methodology
In this section we introduce a novel methodology to measure the importance of macroeconomic news that does not rely upon the economic forecast data.
There are two streams in the literature that use returns at different frequencies. Many studies use high frequency intraday returns around macroeconomic news (see for example Andersen et al., 2003 and Faust et al., 2007) . Hardouvelis (1988) , one of the first proponents of this approach, argues it is necessary to use short windows around macroeconomic news to avoid contamination with noise that is unrelated to the news analyzed. The second approach uses daily returns (e.g. Kuttner, 2001 and Vrugt, 2009 ) with an argument that if the news is important the effect of the news reaction remains at the end of the day. In both cases news is deemed important if a strong and significant relation is found between the surprises in news announcements and returns. Studies using high frequency returns around the announcement find strong results. But the relation is much weaker when daily returns are used. The explanation is that the daily returns are contaminated with non-news information. But this also means that the importance of news is short-lived and only leads to transitory effects on prices.
We propose a new methodology which completely alters the view on the importance of news for daily returns. Our proposed methodology uses the market reaction around news announcements as a proxy of new information. This is superior to using surprises as the relationship between information and returns could be non-linear (e.g. Andersen et al., 2003) , time-varying (e.g. Brazys and Martens, 2013) , or the forecasts used to calculate the surprises may not be a good proxy of the consensus of all market participants. In Section 4 we show this leads to much stronger results for daily returns.
News impact
To provide evidence that economic fundamentals are relevant for asset prices a large and active event study literature has developed 8 . The basic tool in this literature is the following univariate regression
where , is the change in the asset price in a small window following the announcement at time , and
, is the standardized surprise of the announcement at time , see equation (1). The coefficient measures the impact of the announcement on the asset return. In this paper , is a log return starting 5 minutes before and ending 15 minute after the announcement (consistent with Faust et al., 2007) . This 20-minute interval is selected to account for the full reaction to the announcement. The window starts 5 minutes before the time recorded by Bloomberg to account for possible discrepancies between official and Bloomberg recorded times. We also use the total (close-to-close) daily return ( , ) in equation (2) to show that the relation between macroeconomic surprises and daily returns is weaker.
The relation between the initial price reaction and the total daily return
We use a novel approach to investigate the relationship between the return around macroeconomic news and the total return of the day. For each announcement we regress the total announcement day return, , , on the return from 5 minutes before to 15 minutes 9 after the announcement, , :
We see several advantages of this approach. First, the regression R-squared gives a direct indication how much of the variation in daily returns can be attributed to news announcements. Second, we can analyze the importance of specific announcements for bond markets. Third, we directly measure the market reaction as opposed to using the indirect measure of news surprises. Fourth, we do not need surveys to compute surprises allowing us to take into account more announcements and use a longer sample. A disadvantage of our approach is that other events on the same day provide noise on measuring the importance of news announcements. In that sense we provide a lower bound on the importance of news.
The coefficients tell us something about the persistence of the price reaction immediately following the news. First, = 0 implies that the immediate reaction to the news has no lasting effect. Second, = 1 indicates the return earned at the time of the announcement is on average equal to the return at the end of the day. Third, 0 < < 1 means the market on average overreacts to the news and part of the initial reaction is reversed. Fourth, > 1 means after the initial reaction the price drifts in the same direction. Finally, < 0 means that the initial price move is more than offset by returns in the remaining part of the day.
The 2 of the regression in equation (3) indicates how much of the daily variance in bond returns can be attributed to economic news.
Our methodology follows the argument of the literature studying the impact of macroeconomic news on daily returns (e.g. Kuttner, 2001 and Vrugt, 2009 ). The studies argue that if the news is important the effect of the news remains at the end of the day. We argue that the news is important if the initial reaction to the announcement remains at the end of the day. Furthermore, the news is more important if it accounts for a significant part of the daily return variation.
We have to be careful with the interpretation of the results from equation (3), because the intraday return, , , is part of the total day return, , .Theoretically = 1 in a random process where news plays no role. In such a random world and with constant volatility, regressing the total daily return on the intraday return leads to a 2 equal to the proportion of time the intraday interval represents relative to the total trading day. For the purpose of correct inference we establish statistical properties of and 2 of the regression in equation (3) by simulation in Section 3.3.2.
Correct inference
How much of the total daily return is explained by intraday returns if the news-related returns are as (un-)important as other returns? We first derive the outcome analytically under the assumption of constant volatility and normality of returns. Then we describe the bootstrap procedure to account for non-normal returns and time-varying volatility.
The methodology is intuitive. If we assume all returns contribute equally to the total return, then the contribution of any intraday interval would be equal to the ratio of this interval time to the total time.
However, the contribution of some intraday returns is larger because of higher volatility during particular times of the day (e.g. opening and closing times of the trading). To evaluate whether the return around a macroeconomic announcement contributes significantly more to the total return, we compare the contribution of the announcement return to similar returns with no announcement. A significantly larger contribution indicates announcement is important. In this subsection we first derive the properties when returns are normally distributed. We then use a bootstrap to account for the stylized facts of the data.
Normally distributed returns
Assume the bond price evolves as a Brownian motion process with no drift and constant volatility 2 .
The total daily return is the sum of independent and identically distributed 10 intraday log returns
A part of this total return is = ∑ ∈{ 1 ,…, } , where
We estimate the regression (3) for total daily returns on the return of part of that day. The total day return, , can be rewritten as
Then the of the regression in equation (3) 
and the regression 2 is
10
For simplicity we do not use subscript , and assume daily returns are identically distributed.
Hence, in the case that announcement and non-announcement returns are independent and identically distributed, theoretically = 1 and 2 is the fraction of total time the return accounts for.
However, if announcement and non-announcement returns are related, i.e.
(∑ ∉{ 1 ,…, } , ) ≠ 0, then < 1 if the correlation is negative, and > 1 if the correlation is positive 11 . The 2 accounts for less than a fraction of time if the correlation is negative, and more if it is positive.
In regression (3) The coefficients derived are population coefficients. However estimating the sample coefficients is more complicated. While the estimate is unbiased, the 2 is biased upwards in small samples. Consider for example a sample with just two observations. It is always possible to draw a line through two points, thus the 2 is always 1, and the estimation of the true 2 is not possible. Therefore we present simulation results for various sample sizes to grasp the impact of covariance and sample size on 2 and . In Figure   1 we present simulation results when announcement returns and the rest of the day returns are uncorrelated, and when there is a correlation of 0.2. The sample size varies from 10 to 820 observations to cover the range of observations in our news data set. For the largest sample size, the simulation result is as expected theoretically. The 2 in the case of intraday return independence is 1.4% and is 1. However in small samples the 2 is upwards biased, and confidence intervals for both 2 and are wide. Imposing a positive correlation of 0.20 between announcement returns and the rest of the day returns leads to a higher 2 and a higher , with confidence intervals shifted accordingly. The for the largest sample size is 2.69 (1 + 0.2√71) and the 2 is 10% (2.69 2 /72).
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
If the assumption of constant volatility holds, the results can be used to test the hypothesis that a particular intraday return is equally important as other intraday returns. However the assumptions do not hold. First, intraday bond returns are neither distributed normally 13 nor have constant intraday volatility.
Bollerslev et al. (2000) find a distinctive intraday volatility pattern where volatility is higher at the opening and closing of the trading session. We cannot derive formulae for 2 and that account for the stylized facts of the bond market, thus we use a bootstrap procedure that uses bond market data to estimate the properties of equation (3). In the next section we describe the bootstrap procedure and the results from the bootstrap.
Bootstrap
We now describe the data-driven bootstrap procedure to derive the statistical properties of and 2 when there are no announcements. Estimating equation (3) (Bollerslev et al., 2000) we replace returns around announcements with returns on other days at the same time.
The simulation procedure includes two steps. In the first step we replace each of the announcement
with corresponding non-announcement returns. The replacement returns should satisfy two conditions. First, returns should come from the same intraday interval as the announcement returns. Second, there should be no announcement in this intraday interval. For instance, a candidate return to replace the announcement return starting 8:25 and ending 8:45 is the return for the same interval from a day with no announcement during this interval. Finally, each intraday return , is paired with the same day total daily return, , . Note that total announcement returns may include returns from other announcements.
In the second step, we bootstrap regression (3). First we estimate regression (3) using the returns sampled in the first step:
where , and , are the replaced non-announcement returns. We then resample the response variable , :
, * = � +̂, +̂ * , where ̂ * is resampled (with replacement) from ̂. Finally, we estimate regression
The first of the last two steps simulates daily returns, whereas the second step estimates the regression parameters for the simulated data.
Each step includes 1,000 repetitions, amounting to 1,000,000 simulations in total. From each repetition we collect estimates of * and 2 . This forms bootstrapped distributions that are used for inference. The bootstrap includes a two-step procedure to assure our sample is representative for the full period analyzed. is positively biased in small samples where the regression is overfitted, but decreases and stabilizes at 4%.
The figure is higher than the previously noted 1.4% where we assume constant volatility (see Figure 1 ).
Volatility is not constant during the day (Bollerslev, Cai, and Song, 2000) and is higher at the beginning of the open outcry trading session (8.20 EST). This illustrates the necessity to account for the announcement time during the day. Higher 2 could also be because of return correlation. However as Panel B demonstrates that is not different from one. As illustrated in section 3.3.1 this implies return correlation is zero. Thus the resulting increase in 2 is mainly due to seasonality in intraday volatility.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
As an example we look at Nonfarm payrolls announcements that are announced at 8.30. With 195
observations (see Table 1 ) the 2 of the regression in equation (3) will be significant at the 5% significance level if the 2 is larger than 14.6% (the 95% confidence bound for sample size 195 in Figure   2 ). Similarly, the is said to be statistically different from the theoretical value of 1 if the estimated is lower than -0.25 or larger than 2.26. This wide confidence interval indicates that it is unlikely we find to be significantly different from one. As expected confidence intervals shrink with sample size.
Total importance of the news
How important are the returns around macroeconomic announcements? To estimate the total importance of the news we aggregate intraday returns around macroeconomic announcements. Return, , , is formed aggregating intraday returns around 57 announcements, starting 5 minutes before and ending 15 minutes after the announcement 14 on day . We then estimate the regression
Regression is estimated both for the announcement days only and for all trading days. In latter case , is set to zero on the no-news days. Table 2 shows the results of estimating equation (3) for all 57 individual announcements. For 26
Results
Individual announcements
announcements we find that the 2 is significantly larger compared to the 2 when there is no news. The critical values for the inference are bootstrapped as described in section 3.3.2. After accounting for the double counting of the announcements that occur at the same time, there are 17 significant announcements.
The last column of Table 2 presents the ranking of the announcements based on the 2 of regression (3). We first rank the announcements with a significant 2 (10% significance level) in descending order.
Then we rank the insignificant announcements. If multiple announcements occur at the same time we cannot identify which one is causing return. For example PPI and PPI core announcements occur at the same time. The importance of both announcements is lower if we base our ranking on PPI ( 2 =0.07) compared to ranking based on PPI Core ( 2 =0.09). We therefore choose the one with the largest number of observations and assign the same rank for these announcements.
Based on the size of 2 our results indicate that FOMC rate announcements are the most important.
On the 130 FOMC rate announcement days 55% of the variation in announcement day returns is explained by the return reaction to the announcement. This is significant at the 1% confidence level. It is followed by the Employment report that includes both Nonfarm Payrolls and Unemployment figures. The Employment report accounts for 46% of the return variation on the days of Employment report.
Interestingly, both GDP Advanced and GDP Preliminary announcements are very similar in importance, each accounting for 36% of return variation, and ranking 3 rd and 4 th in importance. On the other hand the reaction to the GDP Final announcement is found to be not important, accounting for virtually none of the announcement day return variation. This is in line with the common observation that 14 Announcement returns overlap if the announcements occur less than 20 minutes apart. We make sure the aggregating procedure includes returns only once.
the market finds the later figures of the same group of announcements less important, see for example Andersen et al. (2003) .
Forward Looking is the most important category. Six announcements from this category (seven if both ISM announcements are included) explain a significant fraction of total daily return variation. Within this category ISM Manufacturing is the most important explaining 19% of its announcement day return variation. Import Prices is the most important in the Price category. The explanatory power of two significant announcements, Unit Labor Costs and Cost Civilian Workers, cannot be assigned exclusively to these announcements. The announcement time of these announcements overlaps with announcements from other categories. Consumption, Net Exports and Investment categories each have only one significant announcement.
Our methodology is able to evaluate the importance of the announcements without surprise data.
FOMC Minutes are responsible for 11% of the daily return variation and is the second most important FOMC announcement. The Beige book announcement accounts for only 5% of announcement day return variation. Both these 2 s, however, are not statistically significant.
[Insert Table 2 about here] Table 3 shows that using all 57 announcements and all trading days in equation (4) we find 20% of the total return variation is attributed to macroeconomic news and FOMC releases. Only including days with at least one announcement we find that macroeconomic news accounts for 24% of the return variation. In comparison, announcement return time is only 1.2% of the total return time, and only 1.8 % of the return time on the announcement days. We calculate announcement return time as the fraction of the total time.
Pooled announcements
For example if announcement returns are computed over 1 hour and our time horizon is one day, then the fraction is 1/24.
The table also demonstrates the importance of news aggregation. Although the FOMC target rate announcements are very important on the days when it is announced ( 2 =55%) it only explains 3% of total return variation because these announcements only occur every 6 weeks. Including the next 4 most important announcements (as ranked in Table 2 ) adds another 5% to the 2 , while increasing the list further to include the top 10 announcements with the highest 2 adds another 5%. The top 17 most important announcements (27 announcements in total, some overlapping) can explain 17% of the total daily return variation. Adding the remaining stand-alone insignificant announcements ranked 18 through 42 (30 announcements) increases the 2 by a further 3%. Thus the effect on 2 of including more announcements diminishes if the announcement is less important. The diminishing effect is also clear if only announcement days are considered. In that case including less important announcements brings the 2 down.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Does the relation between total daily return and the initial return reaction to news vary?
Non-farm payrolls announcement is often dubbed the king of announcements (Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998) . The FOMC Rate announcement is another closely watched announcement by market participants.
Our new methodology also indicates these are the most important announcements for Treasuries. We thus choose these announcements to further investigate the time variation in importance. We repeat the estimation of equation (3) the easing has started which ended in December 2008 with the target rate at the 0-0.25 interval. These patterns indicate there might not be a relation between the importance of the news and FOMC hiking and easing periods.
To investigate the variation of the total news importance we estimate the regression (4) in rolling oneyear windows. We have more observations thus we choose a shorter window to investigate the variation of news importance. Figure 4 shows that the 2 of the regression varies from 5% in a one year period ending in December 2000, to 51% in a one year period ending in December 2004. In both cases the announcement time accounts for only 1% of total time.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
What drives the time-variation in the importance of macroeconomic news?
Several studies find the relation between macroeconomic news and asset prices to be time-varying. Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2004) propose a model where the importance of announcements varies over time. In their model the investors change their focus from one announcement to another. Boyd, Hu, and Jagannathan (2005) show that the impact of employment news depends on the stage of business cycle.
For example, positive macroeconomic news can be perceived as good or bad depending on the state of the business cycle. Andersen et al. (2003) find that negative news has a larger price impact than positive news. Goldberg and Grisse (2013) show the reaction of government bonds to news is muted when the VIX is high or the Fed Funds futures rate is low. We also investigate the relation between investor sentiment and the importance of the news. For this we use the sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006) . Finally, Van Dijk, Lumsdaine, and van der Wel (2014) find that federal funds futures rate is more volatile and news have larger impact when next FOMC meeting is further away. We therefore investigate these candidates as drivers of the variation in news importance based on our novel method. In addition we study the combination of first conditioning upon the stage of business cycle and then upon the VIX and the sentiment indices. Goldberg and Grisse (2013) . Although news importance in a small interval around the announcement changes, so can the importance of the non-fundamental events outside this small interval.
For example, if the reaction to the news decreases when the Federal Funds futures is low, but also the price does not move outside of reaction window (zero volatility), the news is the only driver of the bond prices. Our methodology measures the importance of economic news in relation to total return, thus the results can only be the same if the Federal Funds rate and VIX affect all sources of return variation proportionally.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
The last two columns of Panel A show the relationship of the importance of news for bond prices with two versions 15 of the Wurgler (2006, 2007) sentiment index. The index summarizes information from variables believed to proxy for investor sentiment. We test whether sentiment makes fundamental information less important when sentiment (or it's changes) is extremely positive or negative. First, the explanatory power of macroeconomic news is negatively related to the sentiment-level index. The 2 is highest when the sentiment index is at its lowest and monotonically deceases with increases in the sentiment index. This indicates that fundamental news is most important when sentiment is negative. Second, the relation between the sentiment-changes index and news importance is less clear.
Our results do not lend direct support to the visual observation of Baker and Wurgler (2007) that "the volatility of sentiment rises in a speculative episodes 16 . This pattern suggests that the relative influence of fundamentals and sentiment on aggregate market returns changes over time". The regression 2 s as function of function of changes in the sentiment-changes index show a humped pattern with the peak at the moderate sentiment-changes index values, i.e. we expect news to be more important during less speculative periods. Thus our findings do not lend support to the observation that news is less important during more speculative periods as measured by Baker and Wurgler (2007) sentiment-changes index.
In Panel B of the Second, we split the sample into good (for the bond market) and bad news days. A day is defined as good news day if the total announcement return ( , in equation 4) is positive; otherwise the day is defined as bad. The results in Table 4 show there is only 1% difference in explanatory power. Studies find that bad economic news (lower than expected growth or inflation) has larger effect on bonds than good news. However these studies only conclude that the market move in reaction to the bad news is larger, but tell nothing on how much of the total daily return it accounts for.
The results show that the split into good and bad news periods is not informative about the variation of news importance. It is possible that the importance of news depends on the stage of FED rate cycle. For example, when the rates are so low that they cannot go any lower good news (for bond returns) is not as important as bad. Therefore we investigate if good or bad news is more important during easing or hiking.
In Table 5 we split the FED rate cycle into four periods: (1) easing, from the first rate cut until the last rate cut before the next rate increase; (2) hiking, from the first rate increase until the last rate increase before the next rate cut; (3) after easing, between easing and hiking; and, (4) after hiking, between hiking and easing. We further split the sample into good and bad news days as defined previously. Two key findings arise from such conditioning. First, without conditioning upon the news sign, the news is most important between easing and hiking period ( 2 = 0.28). The news is least important during easing ( 2 = 0.21).. The 2 decreases monotonically from "after easing" until the end of easing period. Second, news that is contrary to the direction of FED rate changes is more important. For example good news (positive bond return) is much more important during hiking ( 2 = 0.23) than during easing period ( 2 = 0.05). Recent quick easing period (September 18, 2007 -December 16, 2008 and the null rate period that followed afterwards is of particular importance. Results in last two rows of Table 5 show that in bad news is slightly more important during quick easing period when compared to full sample easing periods. However good news is much more important in the null rate period compared to full sample 'after easing' periods ( 2 of 0.27 during null rate period vs. 0.23 during full sample 'after easing' period).
Our results show that good and bad news are of different importance over the stage of FED rate cycle.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Panels A through C of Figure 5 further investigate effect of the VIX, sentiment-level and sentimentchanges index over the business cycle. We first condition the regression upon the stage of business cycle and then the level of VIX or sentiment indices. The majority of the sample is an expansion period, thus results for the expansions are closer to the sample results. First, Panel A demonstrates that the explanatory power for the same level of VIX is higher during recessions. Second, a higher level of sentiment is related to a decrease in the importance of the macroeconomic news. However Panel B shows that during recessions the explanatory power of the news is also high at extreme levels of positive sentiment. In recessions investors find the news to be more important, especially when the sentiment is very high or low. Finally, Panel C sheds some light on the causes of the flat relationship between sentiment-changes index and news importance. We find during recessions the news is more important when the sentimentchanges index is positive. But during expansions the news is more important when the sentiment-changes index is negative. The explanation for such a relationship is that during bad times (recession) negative sentiment changes makes investors more sentimental and less likely to value economic fundamentals. This is also true during good times (expansions) when the positive sentiment change makes investors more sentimental, thus putting less weight on economic news. Thus we add an additional dimension to Baker and Wurgler (2007) observation. Fundamental news is less important during extreme positive changes in expansions and extreme negative changes in recessions.
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
Finally, in panel D, we investigate news importance conditional upon the time between FOMC rate announcements. We split the days between FOMC announcement days in 5 equal periods. This is different than Van Dijk, Lumsdaine, and van der Wel (2014) where authors use number of FOMC meetings for the time horizon: for example between 3 and 4 meetings ago. Our approach assumes the macroeconomic information is the most relevant for the next FOMC rate decision. Our findings indicate macroeconomic news is least important immediately after the announcement and increasingly more important as the next FOMC meeting date approaches. Van Dijk, Lumsdaine, and van der Wel (2014) find decreasing macroeconomic news impact and decreasing Fed funds futures volatility.
We further split the sample into recessions and expansions based on the date of the FOMC meeting.
In expansions the importance of the announcements increases closer to the FOMC date. Exception is the last week when the explanatory power decreases. Announcement importance is not monotonic in the recession sample. The news in the last week accounts for 49% or total return variation, while the second to last only 15% of total return variation.
Return vs. Surprise Regressions
Individual announcements
The literature finds macroeconomic news is especially important for bond markets (for a review of studies on bond markets see Fleming and Remolona, 1997) . One of the reasons is that bond pricing is simple thus market participants are more likely to agree on the interpretation of the news (Fleming and Remolona, 1997) . We estimate the importance of the individual announcements using equation (2) measuring the intraday response of bond prices to surprises in macroeconomic announcements. We also estimate equation (2) with the daily returns, , ., as the dependent variable. The results are presented in Table  6 . We also include the results from our novel method to make it easy to compare the results.
[Insert Table 6 Using our methodology we are able to correctly rank announcements that are important for the market participants. We select the 5 most important announcements from both the surprise regression in equation (2) based on daily returns and our novel regression in equation (3). In both cases we rank significant announcements from the highest to the lowest 2 . Our novel method cannot distinguish which figure is most important if multiple figures are announced at the same time. Therefore we choose to assign the rank of announcement with most observations. The new methodology suggests a striking change in what are considered important announcements. First, the FOMC rate that is apparently not important in the surprise regression 17 is found to be the most important in our novel regression, accounting for 56% of the variation in the returns on target rate announcement days. This is a well-known issue in monetary policy surprise literature. Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005b) argues that in many standard macroeconomic models macroeconomic or monetary shocks (surprises) have only transitory effect on future path of interest rates thus a limited response of long-term interest rates to such shocks. Gurkaynak, Sack, and 17 We estimate the surprise regression using different methods to estimate FOMC target rate surprises. The status of the FOMC announcement remains "not important" using surprises estimated from both daily and intraday FED funds futures. Kuttner (2001) finds the importance of FOMC target rate announcement is the most important for 3-month T-bills and diminishes with the maturity.
Swanson (2005a) show that for longer term bonds both target rate surprise and future path surprise are needed to explain bond price variation. Thus our methodology can correctly identify the important announcements without correct specification of the surprise component. regression. This indicates the announcements are much less important than previously believed, as they do not lead to sizeable permanent changes in bond prices.
Aggregated announcements
We continue with the comparison between return-and surprise-based regressions for aggregated news. It is straightforward to estimate the importance using the novel methodology. We aggregate intraday returns around macroeconomic news. However we cannot replace the returns in regression (4) with standardized surprises of the news. The return size around news already tells how important the announcement is, thus surprises are at disadvantage if the sign and size of the announcement impact is not accounted for. We weight the surprises (with hindsight) by their impact on high frequency bond price around macroeconomic news, thus accounting for the sign and size of the impact. We then aggregate surprises daily and estimate equation (4) on the announcement days when surprises are available.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
For ease of comparison Table 7 Panel A repeats the estimation results when return-based news measure is used. Panel B shows the results when aggregated surprises are used. Weighted surprises are able to explain 8% of the total announcement day variation and only 6% of total return variation
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. In 18 We also test multiple regression with non-aggregated announcements. Adjusted R-squared in this regression is 8%. This is in line with Hardouvelis (1988) findings that economic news explain up to 7.6% of total daily bond yield comparison, return-based news estimates are able to explain three times more variation (see Panel A, surprises explain 8%, whereas return-based news explains 24%) on announcements days. The ratio between explanatory powers increases further if all days are used (surprises explain 6%, whereas returnbased news 20%). We also report results when only impact sign is used to weight the surprises. The Rsquared drops from 8% to 5% on the news days, and from 6% to 4% when all trading days are used. This shows the importance of surprise weighting.
Panel C of Table 7 reports additional robustness test. We replace the surprises with the standardized changes of the macroeconomic variables. The changes in variables are standardized dividing changes by their sample standard deviations. As for surprises we weight the standardized changes by their impact on high frequency return around the announcement. In comparison to surprised based news, the explanatory power decreases further to 4%. If only the sign of the impact on the market is used, the explanatory power decreases to 3% on news days and mere 2% on all sample days.
The novel methodology demonstrates that macroeconomic news is much more important than previously thought. Both weighted surprises and weighted changes in macroeconomic variables explain less of the daily bond return variation. Note that in 'news-day' regressions we use a smaller sample excluding the days when surprises are not available. FOMC minutes and Beige book announcements are excluded for the same reason, thus our news importance is estimated using 55 of 57 announcements. This makes very little difference ( 2 is also 24%) since FOMC minutes and Beige book are previously found to be not important. This indicates our methodology is robust to inclusion of non-important news.
Conclusion
We introduce a novel methodology to evaluate the importance of news announcements for bond prices.
Instead of using surprises in news announcements we regress daily returns on the 20-minute returns around macroeconomic news announcements. An announcement is considered important if the initial reaction is significantly related to the total announcement day return.
The new methodology has several advantages. First, the regression R-squared gives a direct indication how much of the variation in daily returns can be attributed to news announcements. Second, we can analyze the importance of individual announcements for bond markets in a new way with possibly different conclusions. Third, we directly measure the market reaction as opposed to using the indirect measure of news surprises. Fourth, we do not need surveys to compute surprises allowing us to take into account more announcements and use a longer sample.
variation. The results are also in line with Altavilla, Giannone, and Modugno (2014) who find up to 8% can be explained by macroeconomic surprises.
We contribute to the literature in three ways. First, based on the novel methodology we find macroeconomic announcements account for 20% of the total daily bond return variation. In contrast the existing methodology based on news surprises indicates that only 6% of the total daily bond return variation is explained by news. Second, individually, the most important announcements are the FOMC target rate and employment reports. Whereas the importance of non-farm payrolls figure of employment report is well-known, we provide strong evidence of the importance of FOMC target rate announcements for long term bonds. In fact these announcements can explain 55% of the variation in bond returns on days that these announcements are made. This is in line with Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005b) finding that FOMC statements rather than target rate surprises are important for long term government bonds. Our methodology is able to identify the important announcements even without a proxy for the content of the FOMC statements. Third, we find the importance of news varies over time. The news is less important when the VIX is high and Baker and Wurgler (2007) sentiment is positive. Further, we find news that is contrary to the direction of FED rate changes is more important
The shortcoming of our methodology is that we are not able to identify which announcement is triggering the market response if multiple figures are announced at the same time. This is where the relation between surprises and the 20-minute return around the announcement is still useful.
There are several potential directions for further research. First, we can review the studies that do not find a significant relation between economic news and asset prices. The traditional research agenda so far was to look for better measures of news in announcements 19 or a different source of the news (e.g. semantic analysis of news articles, Tetlock, 2007, or FOMC minutes, Boukus and Rosenberg, 2006) . For example Kuttner (2001) is the first to use the FED funds futures change as monetary surprise. Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005b) use a proxy for a surprise in future path of interest rates. Searching for the relation between the proposed news measures is a difficult task not having a prior knowledge if the news move market. Therefore, we propose first using our novel methodology to identify events that move market. Second, the new method makes it easy to evaluate the importance of announcements that do not have forecast values. Forecasts are available for many U.S. macroeconomic figures. However, forecast data for other countries is scarce. Our methodology can be used in these cases to evaluate the importance of macroeconomic announcements. Also it allows investigating the importance of news that has no explicit expectation and thus a surprise component cannot be calculated. For example the importance of speeches of Federal Reserve officials can now be evaluated. , is total intraday return around announcements on day , starting 5 minutes before announcement and ending 15 minutes after announcement. The regression is estimated in rolling 1-year regression using daily returns. The dashed line shows the fraction of total time attributed to the news returns around announcements. Shaded areas indicate the NBER recessions. , cumulative total return of the day around macroeconomic news. The sample is conditioned upon the NBER expansion-recession and then on the quantiles of the VIX (Panel A), Wurgler(2006,2007) Table gives the estimates for the regression of daily close to close return on the intraday return around a macroeconomic announcement. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, using the bootstrapped distribution of the parameters. Percentile of the bootstrapped distribution is given for the 2 estimate. The percentile is used in ranking announcement importance. The announcement often occurring at the same time are given the same rank of the announcement with the most observations. Superscripts a,…,n indicate the announcements that occur together more than half of the time. Wurgler (2006, 2007) sentiment index of levels ( ⊥ ) and changes (∆ ⊥ ). The sentiment indices are based on the first principal component of six (standardized) sentiment proxies or their changes, where each of the proxies has first been orthogonalized with respect to a set of macroeconomic conditions. Numbers 1 through 5 indicate the quintiles of the conditioning data. Column 'mean' gives the average value of conditioning variable. Panel B splits the sample in the periods. First, we split into expansions and recessions of NBER business cycle. Second, we split into the good and bad news days, where the good news day is defined as a day with positive , . All estimations are based on sample October 1996 -March 2013, except for sentiment indices where the data is available until the end of 2010. Table shows 2 of the regression , = + , + in different subsamples, with , the total daily close to close return, , cumulative total return of the day around macroeconomic news. The sample is first split into FED policy periods: easing, hiking etc. We then split the sample further into good and bad news days, where the good (bad) news day is defined as a day with positive (negative)
, .. The easing (hiking) period is defined as the period from the first interest rate cut (increase) after the last interest rate increase (cut) until the last interest rate cut (increase) before the next interest rate increase (cut). "After easing" ("after hiking") is the period after the easing ("hiking") period but before next hiking (easing). "Quick ease", is the period between 2007 September 18 -2008 December 16 when the fed in a short time cut the target rate from 5.25% to 0-0.25%. "Null rate" period is the period after December 16, 2008 when the FED cut target rates to 0-0.25% range and stayed there. All estimations are based on sample October 1996 -March 2013 (1) of daily close to close return on the intraday return around a macroeconomic announcement , on the surprise element of the announcement (2) and intraday return on the surprise (3) . *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, using the bootstrapped distribution of the parameters for model (1), and HAC errors for models (2) and (3). Superscripts a,…,n indicate the announcements that occur together more than half of the time. (2)) on high frequency prices, or only by the impact sign ('nonweighted'). Similarly, Standardized changes in macroeconomic variables are weighted ('weighted') by their full sample high frequency impact (beta in regression (2)) on bond prices. Or the standardized changes are weighed only by the impact sign ('nonweighted'). Column 'News days' reports 2 of the days when there is at least one announcement. Column 'All days' reports
